National or international public funding? Subsidies or loans? Evaluating the innovation impact of R&D support programmes by Huergo, Elena & Moreno, Lourdes
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
National or international public funding?
Subsidies or loans? Evaluating the
innovation impact of R&D support
programmes
Elena Huergo and Lourdes Moreno
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, GRIPICO
7 March 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64926/
MPRA Paper No. 64926, posted 9 June 2015 16:45 UTC
1 
 
National or international public funding? Subsidies or loans? 
Evaluating the innovation impact of R&D support programmes  
 
 
Elena Huergo 
GRIPICO-Universidad Complutense de Madrid* 
 
Lourdes Moreno 
GRIPICO-Universidad Complutense de Madrid* 
 
March 2014 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to compare the effect of different types of public 
support for R&D projects on firms’ technological capabilities. We distinguish be-
tween low-interest loans and subsidies and between national and European sup-
port. Using data on 2,319 Spanish firms during the period 2002-2005, we estimate 
a multivariate probit to analyse the determinants of firms’ participation in public 
R&D programmes and, later, the impact of this participation on firms’ technologi-
cal capabilities using different indicators. The results provide evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of all treatments for improving firms’ innovative performance. Specif-
ically, although the three kinds of public aid stimulate the intensity of R&D in-
vestment, the highest impact corresponds to soft credits. In addition, national sub-
sidies have a higher impact on internal R&D intensity than EU grants, but the op-
posite relation is found as regards total R&D intensity. With respect to innovation 
outputs, apart from the indirect effect of public support by stimulating R&D in-
tensity, we also find evidence of a direct effect of participation in the CDTI credit 
system and in the European subsidy programme on the probability of obtaining 
product innovations and applying for patents.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a great deal of empirical evidence of the impact of public aid on private R&D, with a 
wide variety of countries analysed and methodologies employed to take into account that pub-
lic support can be endogenous (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; Lach, 2002; Duguet, 2004; 
González, Jaumandreu and Pazó, 2005; González and Pazó, 2008; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; 
OECD, 2006; Clausen, 2008; Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen, 2013). Most papers consider 
only one programme in their analyses and this fact makes it difficult to accurately compare 
the impacts among funding systems, which can differ in their objectives, the national or su-
pranational character of the supporting entity and the funding scheme (Blanes and Busom, 
2004). In this sense, it seems reasonable that their evaluation also provides different results. 
Two exceptions are the papers by García and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento (2011). In both cases, the empirical analysis is based on microdata from the Communi-
ty Innovation Survey (CIS). The first one compares the impact of public support from the 
central government and the European Union (EU) on the innovation of Austrian firms, using 
the third wave of the CIS, which covers the years 1998-2000. To measure the effectiveness of 
these programmes, the authors propose a structural model of the endogeneity of innovation 
and of public support for it. The estimation of this model by the method of asymptotic least 
squares suggests that receiving central government support increases the intensity of R&D by 
2.3 percentage points and yields a 2.5 percentage point increase in the share of sales of new to 
firm products. However, EU support is never significant once national support is taken into 
account. 
The study by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011) also offers a comparison of the impact of 
national and European funding on innovation intensity and performance. The empirical analy-
sis is based on the German part of the CIS for seven waves but, as the data can only be used 
as pooled cross-sections, to face the endogeneity problem, they apply a variant of a non-
parametric matching estimator. In terms of innovation input, their results provide evidence 
that getting funding from both sources displays the highest impact, while EU subsidies have 
higher effects when the firm receives funding from only one source. As for innovation per-
formance, funding from both sources again yields higher sales of market novelties and patent 
applications, but in this case the impact of national funding is superior when only one type of 
grant is obtained.     
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The objective of this paper is to compare the effect of participation within different public 
funding programmes on the technological performance of Spanish firms. This will allow us to 
analyse the relative relevance of two features of public programmes: the national or suprana-
tional character of the financing agency, which is usually associated with the national or in-
ternational character of the R&D project, and the magnitude of reimbursement implied in de-
sign of the public support. Specifically, we consider public programmes based on low-interest 
loans versus national and European innovation subsidies.   
For this purpose, we integrate two data sets. The first one is provided by the Centre for the 
Development for Industrial Technology (CDTI). This public organism grants financial help of 
its own to companies and facilitates access to third-party funds for the execution of both na-
tional and international research and development projects. The second database is provided 
by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds to a sample of innovative firms 
from the Spanish Technological Innovation Survey (the Spanish version of the CIS). Overall, 
we compile a homogeneous sample that consists of an unbalanced panel of 7,007 observations 
and 2,319 firms for the period 2002 to 2005. Specifically, 1,850 of them have received some 
type of public support for their R&D projects during the period. 
The factors taken into account to apply for a low-interest loan from the CDTI or for a national 
or European subsidy can differ. However, some of them may be the same as those that affect 
the firm’s R&D decision. This fact can generate a bias in the impact of these funding instru-
ments on the innovative performance of firms if the CDTI or other public domestic and for-
eign organisms award firms with a better technological profile.  
To deal with this selection problem, in this paper we follow a two-stage procedure. Firstly, we 
estimate a multivariate probit model to study the determinants of each of the three schemes of 
public support. Then, in a second stage, we analyse how this participation affects the techno-
logical capability of the firms. Specifically, we consider R&D intensity to be technological 
input, and product and process innovations and patent applications to be technological out-
puts. We use Heckman’s treatment effect model to face selectivity and endogeneity problems. 
Our results confirm that the three instruments are effective in enhancing firms’ R&D intensi-
ties. However, the highest impacts correspond to soft credits. As for innovation outputs, there 
is an indirect effect of public support by stimulating R&D intensity that has a positive impact 
on the generation of innovations and the application for patents. In addition, we find evidence 
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of a direct effect of participation in the CDTI credit system and in the European subsidy pro-
gramme on the probability of obtaining product innovations and applying for patents. Howev-
er, this direct effect is not present in the case of process innovations. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we highlight how some characteris-
tics of support programmes can justify their different impact on firms’ innovation. In Section 
3, we describe the empirical model and the data. Section 4 shows the estimates and discusses 
the results. Finally, we present key conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. THE LINK BETWEEN INNOVATION IMPACT AND PROGRAMME 
FEATURES  
Assessing the impact of public support of firms’ R&D projects on innovation inputs or out-
puts requires a clear understanding of the design of public programmes. Although the general 
design of an R&D programme is likely to have an impact on innovation, it is difficult to clear-
ly associate certain design features of R&D programmes with (not directly intended) innova-
tion (European Commission, 2009).  
In this paper, we investigate the role of two specific dimensions of supporting schemes: the 
national versus supranational level of the programme and the reimbursable character of the 
aid. As for the first aspect, why should we expect a different impact of R&D subsidies de-
pending on the government level of the supporting organism? There are at least three reasons.  
First of all, the design of R&D programmes can differ between public agencies of different 
levels of governance, especially when they have specific objectives. These aims can consist of 
stimulating specific groups such as R&D champions (picking-the-winners strategy), SMEs 
with major financial constraints to undertake R&D projects, or companies in sectors with 
large knowledge externalities. In the case of national agencies, the objective could also be the 
technological updating of firms in traditional or declining sectors (see Blanes and Busom, 
2004), whereby the agencies try to increase the probability of survival and avoid employment 
losses. And depending on the final objective, selected projects can be more or less market-
oriented or focused on core technologies of participants. For instance, the Framework Pro-
gramme (FP) of the European Union is characterised by the participation of universities and 
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research institutes in consortia and the relevance of pre-competitive research, while the Eure-
ka Programme is more market-oriented (Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002).  
Alternatively, as Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) point out, programmes implemented by 
different jurisdictions could be complementary if the agencies coordinate efficiently to take 
into account the nature and extent of spillovers and other relevant market failures. In fact, 
most supra-national policies are justified by the existence of cross-border spillovers and econ-
omies of scale. In this line, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) test whether the Spanish gov-
ernment and the European Commission have different selection criteria for awarding R&D 
subsidies to firms. They conclude that the determinants of firm participation in each pro-
gramme are different, suggesting that these programmes do not systematically overlap ex-
post, as intended ex-ante by policy makers. 
A second argument is related to the different costs of application in each programme 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2011). These application costs are mainly related to bureaucrat-
ic and administrative requirements that are enlarged when the procedure of granting implies a 
negotiation phase. Firms usually perceive this negotiation phase as resource-consuming, de-
laying the timing of the R&D project (Barajas and Huergo, 2010). 
In addition, application costs increase with coordination costs in the case of programmes that 
imply the existence of self-organised consortia, as often happens in supra-national R&D pro-
grammes. The organisation of the network of partners, the formulation of the proposal and the 
daily monitoring of the project usually entail higher overhead costs in time and human re-
sources than in the case of individual R&D projects. 
And a third reason for having different impacts among programmes has to do with the size of 
expected knowledge spillovers. These spillovers refer both to the company's ability to capture 
information flows from the public pool of knowledge (incoming spillovers) and to the ability 
to control information flows out of the firm (outgoing spillovers) to appropriate the returns 
from innovation.  
The measurement of these spillovers is especially complex in cooperative R&D agreements. 
In fact, as Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find out, there is a significant relation between 
external information flows and the decision to cooperate in R&D, and the level of knowledge 
inflows and outflows is not exogenous to the firm. This element is especially important for 
our analysis, as projects financed through supra-national programmes usually correspond to 
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Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) that involve partners from different countries. In this case, the 
technological capabilities of subsidised firms can be affected not only by public aid but also 
by spillovers of cooperation among partners. However, most papers that study the impact of 
public programmes that support RJVs consider R&D collaboration and R&D public support 
to be an integrated treatment (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Bayona-Sáez and García-
Marco, 2010; Kaiser and Kuhn, 2012; Barajas, Huergo and Moreno, forthcoming). An excep-
tion is the paper by Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007), who interpret RJVs and subsidies 
as heterogeneous treatments for a sample of German and Finnish firms. Although they find 
that the combination of both treatments has a positive impact on the firm’s R&D expenditures 
or the number of patents, when cooperation and public support are separately analysed, subsi-
dies for individual research do not significantly affect R&D or patenting by German firms. 
The reimbursable character of public support is a second dimension that could affect our 
analysis when comparing the effect of subsidies and loans. In this sense, as perceived by pro-
gramme managers, the existence of private co-funding is highly relevant for innovation im-
pact (European Commission, 2009). Preferential (below market) or low-interest loans in fact 
imply a hidden subsidy in terms of interest savings. However, they are fully compatible with 
fiscal incentives, while subsidies in many cases imply that firms cannot benefit from tax cuts 
that are related to R&D investments. The loans also self-enforce more discipline on the recip-
ients, as they assume the commitment to pay back the principal. The monitoring of the project 
development by the agency is consequently also higher. In addition, the percentage of the 
firm’s budget that is allocated to the project is higher than usual, and it may be easier to obtain 
private financing outside the company (Huergo and Trenado, 2010).  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND THE DATA 
Following the literature on impact assessment of R&D policies, the implicit question to an-
swer is what the behaviour of a supported firm would have been if it had not received this 
public aid. The problem is that each firm can only be observed either in the status of receiving 
the support or not. Therefore, to measure the effect of public aid on technological capability, 
we have to take into account that participation within a funding programme agency probably 
depends on the same firm characteristics that determine innovative performance. That is, it is 
necessary to take into account both selection and endogeneity problems.  
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Econometric literature has developed several methods in order to solve these difficulties 
(Heckman, 1979; Cerulli and Potì, 2012; Aerts, Czarnitzki and Fier, 2006; Guo and Fraser, 
2010). In this paper, we follow Heckman’s treatment effect model. Initially, a selection equa-
tion for the participation status is estimated for each of the three programmes considered in 
our analysis: the CDTI programme of low-interest credits, the Spanish programme of R&D 
subsidies and the Framework Programme of the European Commission.1Then, we analyse the 
impact of this participation on some variables that measure technological inputs or outputs.  
Specifically, our first equation is devoted to the participation of firm i ( 1 ) i N  in public 
funding programme m ( 1, 2,3)m  during year t ( 1 ) t T and is formalised in terms of a 
multivariate model given by:  
*1  if  0
0  otherwise
    
mit mit m mit
mit
y x u
y  [1] 
, where *mity  is a latent dependent variable, xmit is the set of explanatory variables that can dif-
fer across equations, m is the vector of coefficients and mitu  are the error terms distributed as 
multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and variance–covariance matrix V, where V 
has a value of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj as off-diagonal elements: 
1 12 13
2 12 23
3 13 23
0 1
0 , 1
0 1
 
 
 
                               
it
it M
it
u
u N
u
 
In the second step, we analyse how the participation of the firm in these programmes affects 
its technological profile, distinguishing between innovation inputs and outputs. 
Initially, we deal with R&D intensity as a measure of technological inputs. Following the ap-
proach of Griffith et al. (2006), we believe that, to some extent, all firms make some innova-
tive effort. However, below a certain threshold, the firm is not capable of picking up explicit 
information about this effort and will not report on it. Thus, we estimate a selection model for 
the observed R&D intensity. In particular, we think that we can measure R&D effort *itid  by 
                                                
1 We have information only about financed projects and therefore we cannot distinguish between the firm’s deci-
sion to apply for the aid and the agency selection among the proposals. The main disadvantage of this lack of 
information is that the selectivity problem is not fully considered.  
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the intensity of R&D expenditure itid  only if the firm makes and reports that expenditure. To 
represent this decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, we assume the following 
selection equation:  
3
*
1 1 1
1
1 if   ´ 0 
0 otherwise
  

     
it mit m it it
mit
r p z
r ,  [2] 
where itr  is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the firm invests in (and reports) 
R&D, and 0 otherwise. If the latent variable *itr  is bigger than a constant threshold (which can 
be zero), we then observe that the firm engages in (and reports) R&D activities. In this equa-
tion, mitp denotes the predicted value for the probability of participating within a public fund-
ing programme, m  is the parameter that reflects the impact of the different public aid pro-
grammes, 1itz  is a vector of observable explanatory variables, and 1 it  is an idiosyncratic error. 
Conditional on the performance (and reporting) of R&D activities, we can observe the quanti-
ty of resources allocated to this purpose; that is, 
3
*
2 2 2
1
´ if 1
0 if 0
  

      
it mit m it it it
mit
it
id p z r
id
r
,  [3] 
where 2itz  is a vector of determinants of the innovative effort, which can differ from those 
determinants that explain the decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, and 2 it  is 
the error term.  
Therefore, we estimate a Heckman model, assuming that the error terms 1 i  and 2 i  follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with a mean equal to 0, variances 21 1   and 22 , and correlation 
coefficient 12 . This structure allows us to analyse whether the impact of public aid differs 
across programmes, not only in the decision to undertake innovation activities but also in 
R&D intensity. 
After this, we focus on technological outputs that we measure through binary variables for the 
generation of process and product innovations and for patent application. We formalise the 
production of technological output as follows: 
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3
3 3 3
1
´  

  it mit m it it
m
w p z ,     [4] 
where 3itz  is a vector of determinants of the technological outputs, which can differ depend-
ing on the dependent variable considered, and 3 it  is the error term. In some specifications, 
we include the latent R&D effort, idit*, as an element of vector 3itz , assuming that the more  
firms spend on R&D activities, the more likely it is that they will obtain technological out-
puts. In this case, public support can affect innovation outputs directly (through m ) or indi-
rectly by increasing R&D intensity. Given that our measures of technological outputs are bi-
nary variables, this equation is estimated as a Probit model.  
Notice that, in equations [2] to [4], to deal with the selection (and endogeneity) problem, the 
predicted probability of participation in each public programme is considered instead of the 
observed participation status. 
3.1. The database 
As we mentioned in the introduction, two data sources are used in this paper. The first one is 
the CDTI database of low-interest loans for R&D projects. During the period 2002-2005, the 
CDTI financed three types of projects through soft loans: Technological Development Pro-
jects (TDP), Technological Innovation Projects (TIP) and Joint Industrial Research Projects 
(JIRP). Specifically, we consider 1,787 projects which were granted a low-interest loan by the 
CDTI during this period. These data are especially suitable for our analysis as most of the 
direct R&D support from the Spanish central government is channelled through the CDTI, 
and the CDTI’s main instrument during this period consists of loans at a preferential interest 
rate. 
This information has been completed with a database that was provided by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds to a sample of innovative firms from the Spanish 
Technological Innovation Survey. In this survey, we find complementary information about 
sources of public financial support for innovation activities from the different levels of gov-
ernment. Unfortunately, we do not have access to information related to R&D tax credits. 
This can limit the results of our analysis as, nowadays, the Spanish tax system is considered 
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one of the most generous among OECD countries in terms of the tax subsidy rate (OECD, 
2012).2 
For the estimations we have eliminated 42 observations with a ratio of R&D expenditures 
over sales bigger than 10 (more that 1000%); these relate mainly to new firms which have 
initiated their technological activities but have not yet begun to sell their products or services. 
The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 2,319 firms (7,007 observations). 
As can be seen in Table 1, around half of the observations correspond to firms that do not 
obtain any type of public funding that specific year, while less than 5% of firms are supported 
through the three schemes in the period. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the sample by type of public funding. 2002-2005 
 
 Yearly observations Firms (in period 2002-2005)
No public funding 3,675 (52.4%) 469 (20.2%) 
Only CDTI loan 1,108 (15.8%) 635 (27.4%) 
Only national subsidy 1,014 (14.5%) 209  (9.0%) 
Only European subsidy 268   (3.8%) 139 (6.0%) 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 587   (8.4%) 624(26.9%) 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 32   (0.5%) 25(1.1%) 
National & European subsidies 263   (3.8%) 104 (4.5%) 
CDTI loan & national & European subsidies 60   (0.9%) 114 (4.9%) 
 7,007 2,319 
Notes: In column 1, firms are classified according to the year that they are supported or not. In column 2, firms 
are classified considering the whole period. 
 
The selection of explanatory variables in the model is based on previous empirical literature 
and is also determined by the availability of information in our databases. As for firms’ partic-
ipation in public R&D programmes (equation [1]), most papers include measures of the firm’s 
technological profile, as the chance to apply increases when the propensity to perform R&D 
projects is higher.3 The available information allows us to consider several variables. The first 
one is internal R&D intensity, which we compute as the ratio of internal R&D expenditures 
                                                
2 A nice exercise associating the use of R&D subsidies and tax incentives by Spanish firms with financing con-
straints can be found in Busom, Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (forthcoming). They conclude that direct funding 
and tax credits are not perfect substitutes in terms of their ability to reach firms experiencing barriers associated 
to market failures. 
3 See, for instance, Blanes and Busom (2004), González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005), Heijs (2005), Clausen 
(2008) or Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna (2013). 
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over total employment. We also define total R&D intensity as total (internal plus external) 
R&D expenditures per employee and the percentage of R&D employment (over total em-
ployment), as a proxy of skilled labour. In our sample, the means of these variables are greater 
in firms that have been awarded a European subsidy than in firms with a national subsidy, and 
superior in these nationally-subsidized firms than in firms with a CDTI loan (see Table 2). 
In addition, we introduce an indicator reflecting whether the firm has technological coopera-
tive agreements. We can distinguish between the kinds of partners, which can be clients, pro-
viders, competitors, consultants and laboratories, other firms of the group, universities, public 
research centres (PRCs) and technological centres. As can be seen in Table 2, the sample 
mean of these indicators is higher for participants in public R&D programmes than for non-
awarded firms. 
We also consider the generation of process and product innovations and the application for 
patents as proxies of technological outputs that can reflect the firm’s innovative intensity and 
technological and commercial success. Again, the sample mean of these variables is higher 
for participants in national R&D programmes than in non-supported firms. However, alt-
hough companies with European funding present a higher probability of applying for patents, 
they do not show any significant differences in declaring product or process innovations with 
respect to non-public funded firms. 
Regarding the sectorial dimension, while firms financed with national and European subsides 
are relatively more present in high and medium-tech service sectors4, the proportion of firms 
supported by the CDTI seems to be higher among manufacturing firms. 
In addition to the variables that reflect technological features, we also consider in our specifi-
cation other firms’ characteristics that can affect their participation in public R&D pro-
grammes. In this sense, the firm’s size is a usual determinant in most papers which deal with 
the impact of public funding. However, its effect on participation is not clear. SMEs are usu-
ally more affected by innovation-related market failures, so their benefits from public aid 
could be higher. However, large firms usually have more resources with which to undertake 
R&D projects and apply for the aid. In addition, public agencies can be too risk-averse to fi-
nance R&D of small firms.  
                                                
4 In Appendix 1, we explain which NACE two-digit industry codes are assigned to each group and present the 
definitions of the variables. In Table A.1 of Appendix 2 we show their main descriptives for the whole sample.  
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Table 2: Means of main variables by type of public funding   
 
 
All firms 
Non-supported 
firms 
(1) 
Supported firms  Difference of means testa) 
CDTI  
loan (2) 
National 
subsidy (3) 
European 
subsidy (4) (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (1) vs (4) 
Technological characteristics         
- Internal R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 10.6   5.5 12.8 16.3 26.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Internal R&D performer (0/1) 0.785 0.649 0.879 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Patent application (0/1) 0.249 0.210 0.284 0.336 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Percentage of R&D employees (%) 58.7 47.4 66.4 74.8 80.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Process Innovation (0/1) 0.541 0.518 0.575 0.614 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.209 
- Product Innovation (0/1) 0.632 0.585 0.674 0.756 0.613 0.000 0.000 0.197 
- R&D performer (Internal or external) (0/1) 0.814 0.693 0.901 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Technological cooperation (0/1) 0.468 0.382 0.494 0.654 0.657 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 12.2 7.0 15.2 19.7 29.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- High and medium-tech manuf. sector (0/1) 0.361 0.350 0.412 0.376 0.268 0.000 0.058 0.000 
- High and medium-tech service sector (0/1) 0.126 0.099 0.103 0.187 0.255 0.352 0.000 0.000 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group (0/1) 0.428 0.418 0.467 0.468 0.440 0.001 0.000 0.307 
- Export intensity (Export over sales) 0.232 0.223  0.263 0.257 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.537 
- Exporter (0/1) 0.687 0.700 0.714 0.709 0.581 0.646 0.467 0.000 
- Foreign capital (0/1)  0.106 0.109 0.113 0.098 0.085 0.710 0.187 0.071 
- Public firm (0/1) 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.018 0.040 0.059 0.350 0.000 
- Size (Number of employees)  313.3 299.1 268.0 365.3 581.5 0.153 0.025 0.000 
- Start-up (0/1) 0.047 0.033 0.060 0.059 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.701 
Number of observations  7,007  3,675 1,764 1,924 623    
Notes: The symbol (0/1) means dummy variable. a): p-value of a two-sample difference of means test. This test is a t-test for continuous variables and a two-sample z-test of 
proportions in case of dummy variables. 
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Statistics in Table 2 show that firms awarded by the CDTI are smaller than companies fi-
nanced through other public schemes, although the difference is not statistically significant 
with respect to non-awarded firms. However, firms supported by national or European subsi-
dies are bigger than non-participants in public systems. Most observations of the sample refer 
to firms which have between 10 and 50 employees (33%), but more than 25% correspond to 
large firms, with more than 200 workers. 
A second dimension frequently considered in the literature is the age of the firm. Again, its 
expected effect on participation is ambiguous. More experienced firms (older firms) are more 
likely to use public aid. However, young firms tend to be more financially constrained and, as 
a consequence, they could apply for and receive public aid more frequently. The information 
in our databases allows us to know whether the firm was born during the last three years. If 
this is the case, we consider the firm to be a start-up. Table 2 shows that the percentage of 
start-ups is higher among firms supported by national agencies, especially by the CDTI. Nev-
ertheless, there are no significant differences in the percentage of firms supported by the EU 
and non-participants: about 3% in both cases.  
Another aspect that should be taken into account is the firm’s competitive position in the ref-
erence market, which could be captured by its market share, the evolution of sales or the ex-
porting activity. The key question here is what to expect. Will firms with more market power 
participate more in public programmes? Regarding international competition, the expected 
answer for exporters would be affirmative, for at least two reasons. Their position in interna-
tional markets could be a signal of their ability to transform innovations into successful prod-
ucts (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). Also, they could be facing lower application costs as they 
are more experienced in dealing with bureaucracy compared to non-exporters (Takalo, Ta-
nayama and Toivanen, 2013). However, in our sample, the presence of firms with foreign 
activity is clearly smaller among EU-funded companies (see Table 2), while in terms of ex-
port intensity, participants supported by the soft loan system or national subsidies do not pre-
sent differences in their foreign activity with respect to non-participants. 
Finally, additional control variables are introduced. Time dummy variables are included, al-
lowing for business cycle effects or changes in national and European agencies’ budgets. As 
an indicator of the ease of access to external capital markets, possibly meaning better 
knowledge of the public aid system, a dummy variable representing the presence of foreign 
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capital among shareholders is incorporated. As can be seen in Table 2, there are no significant 
differences between non-funded firms and domestic supported ones.  
For the same reason, an indicator of business group membership for each firm is considered. 
Agencies might be less willing to finance firms which belong to a group because it is ex-
pected that these firms benefit from the group in terms of having fewer financial restrictions. 
And a dummy variable that represents the presence of public capital is incorporated. Notice 
that a higher proportion of public firms are supported by the European agency. 
With respect to the decision to engage in R&D investment and the determinants of the intensi-
ty of the R&D (equations [2] and [3]), the theoretical literature suggests including variables 
related basically to technological environment, market conditions, financial constraints, ap-
propriability of technological returns and size (reflecting R&D economies of scale) as deter-
minants (see, for example, Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994; Klepper, 1996). 
To capture environmental and demand conditions, we have considered one indicator of the 
firm’s export character, the export intensity and time dummies. We expect that firms operat-
ing in competitive international markets have more incentives to innovate and therefore to 
invest in R&D. 
As for financial restrictions, the high level of risk of R&D projects and the existence of in-
formation asymmetries between firms and suppliers of external finance increase the firms’ 
dependence on internal funds (Hall, 2002). Therefore, firms with liquidity constraints are ex-
pected to have more difficulties undertaking R&D projects. The evidence about the impact of 
financial restrictions on investment effort is mixed. Previous studies for the Spanish economy 
point out that, since 2000, the investment effort has been superior in firms that won public 
support than in those which applied for it without success, and greater in the latter than in 
firms that did not apply for it. Unfortunately, we do not have information about firms’ finan-
cial conditions in our database.5 However, given the aim of this paper, special attention is 
devoted to a firm’s participation in the CDTI low-interest loan programme and national and 
                                                
5 The Spanish Technological Innovation Survey includes information about the relative importance assigned by 
firms to the lack of funds in the firm or group, the lack of external financing or the existence of high innovation 
costs as factors that hamper innovation. However, this information was not provided in the selection of variables 
that the INE gave us to do this research. 
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European innovation subsidies schemes. These public aid instruments could increase the 
chances of performing R&D, as tools that reduce a firm’s financial constraints.  
To indicate appropriability conditions, we use the proportion of R&D employees in the firm 
as a measure of human capital. We think that those firms with more qualified personnel are 
more capable of assimilating new knowledge, whether it is developed internally or externally. 
Piva and Vivarelli (2009) provide evidence that supports this hypothesis for a panel of Italian 
firms. As expected, and as can be seen in Table 2, supported firms present a higher percentage 
of R&D employment than non-financed firms. In addition, following previous papers for the 
Spanish economy, we introduce industry dummies that can also approximate sectorial 
technological opportunities and appropriability conditions (Beneito, 2003; Ortega-Argilés, 
Moreno and Suriñach-Caralt, 2005). Specifically, we included the dummies for firms that 
belong to high and medium-tech sectors defined previously. 
Along with the above variables, the specification includes indicators to capture differences in 
the firms’ investment behaviour in terms of the time of permanence in the market. In 
particular, an indicator of newly born firms (start-ups) is included. Empirical evidence 
suggests that start-ups are usually among the most innovative firms; their survival probability 
as well as their growth rate depends strongly on their innovative behaviour (Audretsch, 1995; 
Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004). Finally, as in equation [1], we include as control variables 
some factors related to firms’ organisational aspects: belonging to a group, foreign capital, 
public capital and technological cooperation. 
With respect to the technological output equation [4], we try two different specifications. In 
the first, we consider almost the same explanatory variables as in the technological input 
equation [3]. In the second, besides the variables that reflect participation in public pro-
grammes and time, size and sectorial dummies, only the prediction of the R&D intensity is 
added as an explanatory variable. This allows us to discuss the existence of direct and indirect 
effects of public funding. 
 
4. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of equations [1] - [4] depicted in Sec-
tion 3. We begin with the explanation of participation in public aid programmes. Later, we 
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analyse how participation in these programmes affects the technological performance of the 
firms, distinguishing between innovation inputs and outputs. 
 
4.1. The determinants of participation in public R&D programmes 
Table 3 shows the estimation of the determinants of firms’ participation in public aid pro-
grammes. Considering that we have information about three systems of public aid, we use a 
multivariate probit model (seemingly unrelated probit model).6 Some of the explanatory vari-
ables are included with one lag in the estimates to prevent endogeneity problems.  
As expected, the correlation coefficients ρ21and ρ32 are significantly different from zero and 
positive. In accordance with Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) and Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento (2011), national support and European funding are positively linked to each other. The 
same happens with soft loans and national subsidies, indicating the presence of common un-
observed factors that affect the probability of participating in both programmes. A positive 
shock in the probability of getting a national subsidy would also translate into a positive 
shock on the likelihood of being awarded an EU grant and a CDTI loan. However, ρ31 is non-
significant, implying that there are no common unobserved factors affecting the probabilities 
of participating in the national soft loan system and the scheme of European subsidies. 
As for the explanatory variables, most of them are statistically significant and their coeffi-
cients have the same sign in all columns. However, the joint chi-square test clearly rejects the 
equality of coefficients across equations (p-value=0.000). 
The first fact that can be highlighted from Table 3 is the positive effect of having a higher 
technological profile on the probability of participation in all public aid programmes. The 
internal R&D intensity of the previous year has a statistically positive impact for all kinds of 
funding. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, the participation in subsidy pro-
grammes reacts more sensitively to prior innovation experience than in the CDTI loan system.  
                                                
6 See Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). 
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Table 3: Participation in public R&D programmes. Multivariate Probit model 
 CDTI loan programme  National subsidy programme  European subsidy programme 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient    S.D.  Coefficient     S.D.  Coefficient  S.D. 
Technological characteristics        
- Internal R&D intensity (in logs.) (t-1) 0.030 *** 0.007  0.108 *** 0.008 0.081 *** 0.013 
- Patent application (t-1) 0.157 ** 0.049  0.080  0.049 0.106  0.067 
- Technological cooperation with:           
 clients (t-1) -0.019  0.072  0.171 ** 0.068 0.185 ** 0.085 
 competitors (t-1) -0.228 ** 0.086  0.232 *** 0.077 0.425 *** 0.089 
 other firms from the group (t-1) -0.062  0.076  -0.073  0.075 0.194 ** 0.094 
 providers (t-1) -0.021  0.064  -0.205 ** 0.063 -0.086  0.083 
 consultants & laboratories (t-1) 0.013  0.067  -0.097  0.075 -0.022  0.096 
 universities, PRCs and technological centres (t-1) 0.006  0.050  0.487 *** 0.049 0.413 *** 0.069 
- High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.105 ** 0.047  -0.016  0.048 -0.224 ** 0.072 
- High and medium-tech service sector -0.224 ** 0.077  0.342 *** 0.069 0.410 *** 0.086 
Other firm characteristics        
- Belonging to a group 0.056  0.051  0.116 ** 0.052 0.035  0.075 
- Exporter (t-1) 0.160 ** 0.052  -0.012  0.052 0.012  0.072 
- Foreign capital  -0.087  0.070  -0.193 ** 0.072 -0.137  0.104 
- Public firm -0.200  0.192  0.261  0.171 0.686 *** 0.184 
- Size (in logs.) 0.438 *** 0.078  0.011  0.068 -0.278 *** 0.086 
- Size squared  -0.038 *** 0.008  0.006  0.007 0.034 *** 0.008 
- Start-up 0.360 ** 0.161  0.126  0.149 -0.595 ** 0.229 
ρ21 0.173***  (0.000) 
ρ31 -0.056       (0.040)  
ρ32 0.302***  (0.000) 
Test [CDTI loan-National subsidy] 0.000 
Test [CDTI loan-European subsidy] 0.000 
Test [National subsidy-European subsidy] 0.000 
Log of likelihood function -5619.5 
Number of observations (number of firms) 4333 (1867) 
 
Notes: S.D.: Standard deviation. (t-1) denotes that the variable is included with one lag. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. 
Test reports the p-value of a test of equality of coefficients. ρ21, ρ31 and  ρ32 (p-values in parentheses) are the correlation coefficients across equations. Coefficients significant 
at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
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In addition, having technological agreements in general increases the probability of obtaining 
European funding. This result is coherent with the objectives of the Framework Programme, 
which promotes cooperation between firms of different countries. The European agency is 
especially sensitive to cooperation with competitors and with universities, PRCs and other 
technological centres. A similar effect is obtained for participation in the national funding 
programme with the exception of the cooperation with providers. Our results are in accord-
ance with García and Mohnen (2010), who find that Austrian firms which cooperated in inno-
vation were more likely to get help from both national and EU sources during the period 
1998-2000. A similar result is obtained by Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (forthcoming) for 
Belgian firms but only for small and medium firms which cooperate with foreign firms. How-
ever, technological cooperation does not seem to increase the propensity to participate in the 
soft loan programme. Only cooperation with competitors has a significant but negative im-
pact. 
Being a patent applicant in the previous year only positively affects the chance of participa-
tion in the soft loan system.7 It seems that the CDTI is especially sensitive to the previous 
technological success of candidate firms in order to award a loan. These results are in accord-
ance with the evidence provided by Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna (2013) for the same loan 
system.  
Regarding belonging to a high or medium-tech sector, the results confirm what we observed 
in the descriptives. In fact, high and medium-tech service firms have a higher probability of 
participating in subsidy programmes, while the low-interest loans by CDTI favour firms 
which operate in high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors. 
As for the rest of the firms’ characteristics, being an exporter in the previous year increases 
the probability of participating in the CDTI low-interest loan system but does not affect par-
ticipation in national and European subsidy systems. The presence of foreign capital has a 
negative effect for obtaining national funding. This result suggests that the national govern-
ment is more reluctant to finance firms that belong to foreign groups than to domestic ones. 
García and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011) also find a negative effect 
of this variable on European funding, but in our sample, we do not find this result. Group 
membership does not have a significant effect on low interest loans or European subsidies.  
                                                
7 In a complementary estimation without distinguish among the partners of technological cooperation, patent 
application is also significant in the national and European public subsidies. 
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Another interesting result in Table 3 is the existence of a non-linear effect of size on the prob-
ability of participating in low-interest loan and European funding systems, but in a different 
way. As firms are larger, they have a higher probability of being awarded by the CDTI, but 
the increase in size affects the probability of obtaining financing marginally less. This result, 
which is in accordance with Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna (2013), suggests that applying for 
CDTI loans has some costs in terms of time and searching for information, so larger firms 
have a higher probability of participating, although as a certain amount of resources is ob-
tained, the size effect is smaller. However, in line with Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011), 
the estimated curve describes a U-shaped relationship between the European subsidy receipt 
and firm size. Unexpectedly, size does not appear to be significant for national subsidies.  
Finally, being a start-up positively and negatively affects the chance of participation in soft 
loan and European subsidy programmes, respectively. Although more experienced firms are 
more likely to know and use public aid programmes, younger firms are usually more finan-
cially constrained, having more incentives to apply for and receive them. It seems that the first 
effect exceeds the second one in the case of European public aid. The opposite happens with 
low-interest loan systems.   
4.2. R&D intensity 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation associated with equations [2] and [3] explained in 
Section 3. Specifically, we present the marginal effects of the Generalized Tobit model where 
the participation and the intensity equations are estimated consistently by maximum likeli-
hood.8 
In order to analyse whether the determinants of internal R&D expenditures differ from the 
determinants of total R&D expenditures, we present the results of the Heckman model for 
both internal and total R&D intensity. Notice that the correlation term rho is significant in 
both estimations, pointing out the necessity of estimating a selection model for the observed 
intensity. Initially, we tried the same set of explanatory variables for both equations 
1 2( )it itz z , but ended up including only those variables that turn out to be statistically signif-
icant in each specification.  
                                                
8 In Table A.2 of Appendix 2, we present the coefficients of this estimation. 
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Table 4: R&D intensity (in logarithms). Generalized Tobit model 
 Internal R&D  Total R&D  
 Propensity to engage 
in internal R&D (0/1) 
 Internal 
R&D intensity 
 Propensity to engage 
in R&D (0/1) 
 Total 
R&D intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dy/dx               S.D.  dy/dx              S.D.    dy/dx               S.D.  dy/dx              S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.808 *** 0.127 2.941 *** 0.405 0.807 *** 0.127 2.825 *** 0.411 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.759 *** 0.097 2.608 *** 0.271 0.752 *** 0.097 2.483 *** 0.276 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.067  0.184 2.456 *** 0.449 0.075  0.184 2.723 *** 0.457 
         
Technological characteristics         
- Percentage of R&D employees (t-1) 0.001 *** 0.000   0.001 *** 0.000   
- Technological cooperation   -0.107 ** 0.037   -0.037  0.037 
- Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.040 *** 0.012   0.040 *** 0.012   
- High and medium-tech manufacturing sectors   0.366 *** 0.042   0.369 *** 0.042 
- High and medium-tech service sectors   0.532 *** 0.067   0.491 *** 0.068 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group -0.037 *** 0.011 0.099 ** 0.041 -0.137 ** 0.011 0.134 *** 0.041 
- Exporter (t-1) 0.044 *** 0.015   0.045 ** 0.015   
- Export intensity (t-1)   0.295 *** 0.089   0.309 *** 0.090 
- Foreign capital  0.057 *** 0.012 0.221 *** 0.058 0.056 ** 0.012 0.232 *** 0.058 
- Public firm   -0.475 ** 0.154   -0.564 ** 0.157 
- Size (in logs.) 0.001  0.004 -0.600 *** 0.017 0.001  0.004 -0.600 *** 0.016 
- Start-up   0.302 ** 0.130   0.314 ** 0.132 
         
Selection term, rho    0.389 *** 0.054   0.414 *** 0.053 
Log of Likelihood Function -6,385.0 -6,436.1 
Number of observations (number of firms) 4,326 (1867) 4,326 (1867) 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3. S.D.: Standard deviation. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a con-
stant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004.  
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Although it is possible to assume that most variables are exogenous, the indicators for being 
an exporter, technological cooperation and the percentage of R&D employees are again intro-
duced with a lag in the decision equation. For the same reason, export intensity is also includ-
ed with a lag in the R&D intensity equation.   
With respect to the decision to engage in R&D, the estimations in columns (1) and (3) show 
that being awarded a soft credit or a national subsidy clearly increases the probability of con-
ducting R&D activities. Participation in the soft loan and national subsidy funding systems 
raises the probability of self-financing internal R&D activities 81.8 and 76.0 percentage 
points, respectively. The impact is quite similar when we consider total R&D expenditures. 
However, participation in European subsidy programmes does not seem to affect the decision 
to undertake technological activities.  
Table 4 also shows that most explanatory variables increase the probability of carrying out 
R&D expenditures. Firms which operate in international markets (exporters and firms with 
foreign capital) present a higher probability of engaging in R&D activities. Specifically, firms 
involved in exporting activities during the last year are 4.4 percentage points more likely to 
self-finance internal R&D activities, stressing the complementarity between internationalisa-
tion and R&D investment strategies.  
In addition, the coefficient for the percentage of R&D employment confirms the relevance of 
having qualified workers to more easily assimilate new knowledge. This result is in line with 
Huergo and Moreno (2011), who, with another Spanish database, also find a positive impact 
of human capital approximated by the proportion of engineers and graduates on firms’ innova-
tion behaviour.  
A positive sign is also obtained for technological cooperation, which can also be considered a 
proxy of the firm’s technological capability. Unexpectedly, we do not find any significant 
effect of the firm’s size on the decision to carry out R&D. The only variable which has a neg-
ative impact on the probability is belonging to a group.  
With respect to magnitude of R&D expenditures, as can be seen in columns (2) and (4), once 
the firm has decided to invest, the three kinds of public aid stimulate the intensity of R&D 
investment, although the highest impact corresponds to soft loans. The effects are quite simi-
lar when we consider total R&D expenditures. Our results are in line with García and Mohnen 
(2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011), who define R&D intensity as the ratio of 
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R&D expenditures over sales. However, our coefficients are larger. This difference can be 
explained by the fact that in our sample there is a relevant percentage of start-ups that present 
very high R&D intensities.  
Export intensity, belonging to a group, being partly owned by foreign capital and being a 
start-up also increase the intensity of R&D investment. These results are in accordance with 
Ortega-Argilés, Moreno and Suriñach-Caralt (2005), Griffith et al. (2006) and Hall, Lotti and 
Mairesse (2009). As expected, firms operating in high and medium-tech sectors also present  
greater R&D activity. The only variables with a negative impact on R&D intensity are the 
firm’s size and being a public firm.  
4.3. The production of technological outputs 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the estimation of equation [4] for three alternative 
measures of innovation outputs: product innovation, process innovation and patent applica-
tion. Given the binary character of our innovation outputs, the equation is estimated as a pro-
bit model. As we have explained in Section 3, we consider two alternative specifications to 
analyse the impact of public support on the probability of obtaining technological results.9 
In the first one (columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 and column (1) of Table 6), we consider the 
same control variables as in the previous equation to be explanatory variables and we do not 
take into account that the technological effort of the firm can increase its chance of obtaining 
a process or product innovation. In the second one (columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 and col-
umn (2) of Table 6), R&D intensity is included as an explanatory variable. Notice that the 
innovation effort is presumably endogenous for achieving innovation outputs – that is, there 
can be unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics that incentivise firms to in-
vest more in R&D and, at the same time, make them more productive in the use of this effort. 
This could generate spurious correlation and upward bias in the coefficient of R&D intensity. 
To face this problem, we interpret the R&D intensity equation [3] as an instrumental variables 
equation, and use the predicted R&D intensity obtained from this equation instead of the ob-
served intensity as an explanatory variable in equation [4]. 
                                                
9 In Tables A.3 and A.4 of Appendix 2, we present the coefficients of these estimations. 
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Table 5: Product and process innovation. Probit model 
 
 Product innovation  Process innovation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dy/dx           S.D.   dy/dx           S.D.   dy/dx            S.D.   dy/dx            S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 1.779 *** 0.202 1.445 *** 0.248 0.669 *** 0.207 0.308  0.265 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.247 ** 0.122 -0.013  0.181 0.329 ** 0.125 -0.104  0.191 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.848 *** 0.223 0.375 * 0.223 0.334  0.223 -0.200  0.233 
          
Total R&D intensityb)   0.105 ** 0.047   0.151 *** 0.050 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.061 *** 0.017 0.027  0.024 -0.060 *** 0.019 -0.121 *** 0.026 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.095 *** 0.024 0.065 * 0.034 -0.150 *** 0.031 -0.207 *** 0.041 
Belonging to a group -0.061 *** 0.017    -0.006  0.018   
Exporter (t-1) 0.033  0.020    0.044 ** 0.022   
Foreign capital  0.095 *** 0.022    0.044 * 0.025   
Public firm -0.201 ** 0.071    -0.281 *** 0.063   
Size (in logs.) -0.018 ** 0.007 0.036  0.028 0.038 *** 0.007 0.121 *** 0.030 
Start-up 0.210 *** 0.035    0.124 ** 0.052   
Log of Likelihood Function -2,354.7  -2,371.8 -2,690.9  -2,695.9 
Number of observations 4,333  4,325 4,333  4,325 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3.b) The prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estima-
tions (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.D.: Standard deviation. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to 
change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
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Table 6: Patents Application. Probit model 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  dy/dx            S.D.   dy/dx             S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 4.498 *** 0.197 2.752 *** 0.236 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) -1.046 *** 0.112 -0.974 *** 0.174 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 3.246 *** 0.198 1.952 *** 0.202 
      
Total R&D intensityb)   0.127 *** 0.046 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector -0.015  0.016 -0.030  0.023 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.128 *** 0.033 0.054  0.040 
Belonging to a group -0.077 *** 0.016    
Exporter (t-1) -0.240 *** 0.023    
Foreign capital  0.196 *** 0.029    
Public firm -0.188 *** 0.023    
Size (in logs.) -0.083 *** 0.007 0.006  0.027 
Start-up 0.084  0.057    
Log of Likelihood Function -1,994.1  -2,073.2 
Number of observations 4,333  4,325 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3. b) The 
prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.D.: Standard devia-
tion. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. 
For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant 
and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004.  
 
 
When the prediction of the R&D intensity is not included in the estimates, being supported by 
public programmes clearly increases the probability of obtaining product innovations. Again, 
the highest impact is associated with participation in the CDTI loan system. Participation in 
this programme and in the national subsidy system also raise the probability of obtaining pro-
cess innovations, while European funding does not seem to have any effect. Note, however, 
that more than 25% of firms in our sample receive both national and European support during 
the period.  
In addition, the probability of applying for patents is higher for firms awarded a CDTI credit 
or a European grant, but national subsidies negatively affect this probability. In this line, 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011) find that German firms that receive combined support 
from national and European administrations increase their patent applications, while this ef-
fect disappears when companies are only financed by EU programmes. However, Spanish 
firms rarely use patents to protect their technological results (Barajas, Huergo and Moreno, 
2011). 
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As we expected, when R&D intensity is added to the specification, the impacts of participat-
ing in public programmes are lower, and eventually become non-significant. R&D intensity 
has a significant positive impact on the generation of the three technological outputs. While 
the quantitative effect of this variable on them is quite similar, the effect on process innova-
tion is the biggest. In this sense, public support has an indirect effect by stimulating R&D 
intensity. The results also suggest that participating in the CDTI loan programme and in the 
European subsidy programme has a direct positive effect on the probability of obtaining prod-
uct innovations. 
With respect to the control variables, being partly owned by foreign capital increases the 
probability of obtaining technological outputs. The opposite happens with public firms: they 
are less likely to be successful. The rest of the explanatory variables present a different impact 
depending on the measure of technological output. For example, as in previous empirical evi-
dence, the youngest firms have a higher probability of innovating, but they do not present any 
difference with respect to the other firms in terms of patent applications. Belonging to a group 
reduces product innovations and patent applications but has not effect on process innovations. 
With respect to size, larger firms show a higher probability of obtaining process innovations 
and a lower probability of applying for patents and obtaining product innovations. However, 
when we include the R&D intensity in the specification, size turns to be non-significant for 
patents and product innovations. Also, it seems that the activity sector also affects firms’ 
technological results. Specifically, companies operating in high and medium-tech sectors are 
more innovative in terms of product innovations. The opposite happens in the case of process 
innovations.   
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper is to compare the effect of participating within different public 
R&D funding programmes on firms’ technological performance. This will allow us to analyse 
the relative relevance of two features of public programmes: the national or supranational 
character of the financing agency and the magnitude of reimbursement implied in the design 
of public support.  
Specifically, for the empirical analysis, we consider three types of instruments used by public 
administrations to support Spanish firms: the programme of low-interest loans provided by 
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the CDTI, the main national agency which finances firms’ R&D projects; the national scheme 
of R&D subsidies; and the European system of R&D grants.   
To face the typical selectivity and endogeneity problems that are present in this kind of analy-
sis, we use Heckman’s treatment effect model, following a two-stage procedure. Firstly, we 
estimate a multivariate probit model to study the determinants of participation in each of the 
three public programmes. Afterwards, in a second stage, we analyse how this participation 
affects the technological capability of the firms. Specifically, we consider R&D intensity to be 
technological input, and product and process innovations and patent applications technologi-
cal outputs.  
The results obtained for a sample of 2,319 Spanish firms during the period 2002-2005 can be 
summarised as follows: 
Firstly, participation in national subsidy programmes and participation in European subsidy 
programmes are positively linked to each other. The same happens with CDTI soft loans and 
national subsidies schemes, indicating the presence of common unobserved factors that affect 
the probability of participating in both programmes. 
Secondly, being awarded a CDTI soft loan or a national subsidy clearly increases the proba-
bility of conducting R&D activities. However, participation in European subsidy programmes 
does not seem to affect the decision to undertake these activities.  
Thirdly, once the firm has decided to invest in R&D, the three kinds of public aid stimulate 
the intensity of R&D investment, with soft loans having the highest impact. National subsi-
dies have a higher impact on internal R&D intensity than EU grants, but the opposite relation 
is found as regards total R&D intensity. This suggests that international funding is more ef-
fective for fostering external R&D activities. 
As for innovation outputs, public support has an indirect effect by stimulating R&D intensity, 
which has a positive impact on innovations and patent applications. In addition, we also find 
that participation in the CDTI loan system and in the European subsidy programme has direct 
positive effects on the probability of obtaining product innovations and applying for patents. 
However, this direct effect is absent with regard to process innovations.  
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Appendix 1 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
Belonging to a group: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to a 
group. 
Exporter: Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the company exported during the peri-
od. 
Foreign capital: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly owned by a 
foreign firm (more than 50% of foreign capital during the period). 
High and medium-tech manufacturing: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors (NACE2 codes 24, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35). 
High and medium-tech services: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company 
belongs to high-tech services (NACE2 codes 64, 72, 73, 92) 
Participation in CDTI loan programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
firm has been awarded a CDTI soft loan during the year. 
Participation in national subsidy programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the firm has been awarded a national subsidy during the year. 
Participation in European subsidy programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the firm has been awarded a European subsidy during the year. 
Patent application: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm applied for patents 
during the period. 
Process innovation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has obtained a pro-
cess innovation during the year.  
Product innovation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has obtained a 
product innovation during the year.  
Public firm: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly publicly owned 
(more than 50% of public capital during the period). 
R&D performer: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has positive expendi-
tures on R&D during the year. 
Internal R&D intensity: Ratio of internal expenditures on R&D over total employment. 
Size: number of employees during the current year. 
Start-up: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm was created during the last 
three years. 
Technological cooperation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company estab-
lished technological cooperation agreements during the last three years with other partners. 
Total R&D intensity: Ratio of total expenditures on R&D (including technology imports) 
over total employment. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A.1: Statistics of main variables 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
R&D funding (1/0)      
With own funding  0.742 0.438 0 1 1 
Participation in CDTI loan programme 0.255 0.436 0 1 0 
Participation in national subsidy programme 0.275 0.446 0 1 0 
Participation in European subsidy programme 0.089 0.284 0 1 0 
Percentage of funding (%)      
Own funding  65.5 42.7 0 100 93.5 
Funded with a national subsidy 8.1 19.8 0 100 0 
Funded with a European subsidy 3.2 15.2 0 100 0 
Other firm characteristics (1/0)      
Belonging to a group 0.428 0.495 0 1 0 
Exporter 0.687 0.464 0 1 1 
Foreign capital  0.106 0.307 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.361 0.480 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.126 0.332 0 1 0 
Internal R&D performer   0.785 0.411 0 1 1 
Patent application 0.248 0.432 0 1 0 
Process Innovation 0.541 0.498 0 1 1 
Product Innovation 0.631 0.482 0 1 1 
Public firm 0.015 0.120 0 1 0 
R&D performer (Internal and external) 0.814 0.389 0 1 1 
Start-up 0.047 0.211 0 1 0 
Technological cooperation with: 0.468 0.499 0 1 0 
   - clients    0.128 0.335 0 1 0 
   - competitors 0.088 0.283 0 1 0 
   - consultants & laboratories 0.116 0.321 0 1 0 
   - PRCs 0.123 0.329 0 1 0 
   - other firms of the group  0.111 0.315 0 1 0 
   - providers  0.174 0.379 0 1 0 
   - technological centres 0.195 0.396 0 1 0 
   - universities 0.249 0.432 0 1 0 
Other firm characteristics (quantitative):      
Export intensity (Export over sales) 0.232   0.283 0 1 0.100 
External R&D Expenditures (K€) 329.5 2,562.0 0 54,800 0 
Internal R&D Expenditures  1,154.4 5,103.1   0 72,300.0 214.1 
Percentage of R&D employees (%) 58.7 39.2 0 100 66 
R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 10.1   32.7 0 1,268.4 2.7 
Size (Number of employees)  313.3 1,009.9 1 13,023 71 
Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 12.2   38.9 0 1,268.4 3.4 
Number of observations (firms) 7,007 (2,319)  
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Table A.2: R&D intensity (in logarithms). Generalized Tobit model 
 
 Internal R&D  Total R&D  
Propensity to engage 
in internal R&D (0/1)
(1) 
 Internal 
R&D intensity 
(2) 
 Propensity to engage 
in R&D (0/1) 
(3) 
 Total 
R&D intensity 
(4) 
Coefficient       S.D. Coefficient        S.D.  Coefficient        S.D.  Coefficient        S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programme a) 4.574 *** 0.730 3.469 *** 0.414 4.570 *** 0.729 3.395 *** 0.421 
Participation in national subsidy programme a) 4.300 *** 0.544 3.104 *** 0.284 4.256 *** 0.542 3.014 *** 0.289 
Participation in European subsidy programme a) 0.377  1.045 2.500 *** 0.444 0.425  1.044 2.776 *** 0.452 
         
Technological characteristics         
- Percentage of R&D employees (t-1) 0.005 *** 0.001   0.005 *** 0.001   
- Technological cooperation   -0.107 ** 0.037   -0.037  0.037 
- Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.226 *** 0.065   0.227 *** 0.065   
- High and medium-tech manufacturing sector   0.366 *** 0.042   0.369 *** 0.042 
- High and medium-tech service sector   0.532 *** 0.067   0.491 *** 0.068 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group -0.195 *** 0.062 0.074 * 0.042 -0.207 ** 0.062 0.120 ** 0.043 
- Exporter (t-1) 0.235 *** 0.073   0.238 ** 0.073   
- Export intensity (t-1)   0.295 *** 0.059   0.309 *** 0.090 
- Foreign capital  0.390 *** 0.099 0.260 *** 0.058 0.385 ** 0.099 0.273 *** 0.060 
- Public firm   -0.475 ** 0.154   -0.564 *** 0.157 
- Size (in logs.) 0.004  0.025 -0.599 *** 0.017 0.006  0.025 -0.599 *** 0.017 
- Start-up   0.302 ** 0.130   0.314 ** 0.132 
         
Selection term, rho    0.389 *** 0.054   0.413 *** 0.053 
Log of Likelihood Function -6,385.0 -6,436.1 
Number of observations (censored) 4,326 (820) 4,326 (820) 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3. S.D.: Standard deviation. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004.  
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Table A.3: Product and process innovation. Probit model 
 
 Product innovation Process innovation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Coefficient     S.D.  Coefficient       S.D.  Coefficient      S.D.  Coefficient     S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 5.239 *** 0.596 4.563 *** 0.730 1.748 *** 0.540 0.805  0.692 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.729 ** 0.358 -0.094  0.532 0.859 ** 0.326 -0.270  0.499 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 2.499 *** 0.659 2.537 * 0.656 0.872  0.582 -0.522  0.608 
         
Total R&D intensityb)   0.308 ** 0.138   0.395 ** 0.132 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.183 *** 0.052 0.079  0.072 -0.158 *** 0.049 -0.313 *** 0.063 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.301 *** 0.081 0.199 * 0.111 -0.382 *** 0.077 -0.528 *** 0.106 
Belonging to a group -0.180 *** 0.050   -0.015  0.047   
Exporter (t-1) 0.096  0.059   0.115 ** 0.056   
Foreign capital  0.300 *** 0.075   0.118 * 0.070   
Public firm -0.533 ** 0.178   -0.722 *** 0.173   
Size (in logs.) -0.052 ** 0.020 0.107  0.082 0.100 *** 0.019 0.317 *** 0.079 
Start-up 0.851 *** 0.232   0.347 ** 0.159   
Log of Likelihood Function -2354.7  -2371.8 -2690.9  -2695.9 
Number of observations 4333  4325 4333  4325 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in the programme is obtained from Table 3. b)  The prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations 
(3) and (4) in Table A.2. S.D.: Standard deviation. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 
and 2004.  
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Table A.4: Patents Application. Probit model 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coefficient         S.D.  Coefficient        S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 14.952 *** 0.657 9.010 *** 0.774 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) -3.477 *** 0.369 -3.189 *** 0.571 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 10.789 *** 0.654 6.392 *** 0.660 
      
Total R&D intensityb)   0.415 ** 0.150 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector -0.052  0.055 -0.099  0.077 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.387 *** 0.092 0.169  0.121 
Belonging to a group -0.256 *** 0.055    
Exporter (t-1) -0.730 *** 0.068    
Foreign capital  0.572 *** 0.076    
Public firm -0.983 *** 0.243    
Size (in logs.) -0.275 *** 0.024 0.018  0.088 
Start-up 0.257  0.161    
Log of Likelihood Function -1,994.1  -2,073.2 
Number of observations 4,333  4,325 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3. b) The 
prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table A.2. S.D.: Standard devia-
tion. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. Coefficients significant 
at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
